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Abstract. Smart sanctions are an increasingly popular tool for ban-
ning rogue actors from the global economy. In this paper, by analyz-
ing the smart sanctions lists issued by major institutions worldwide,
we identify the hierarchical influence structure among these institutions
that encourages them to take such actions. By performing a Helmholtz–
Hodge decomposition of the influence network among the institutions,
as constructed from the smart sanctions lists they have issued, we show
that meaningful insights about the hierarchical influence structure be-
hind smart sanctions can be obtained.
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1 Introduction
As globalization progresses, economic trade among nations has been growing
at an increasing rate [10]. There is no doubt that this global expansion of eco-
nomic trade contributes to the growing prosperity for the global economy, but
the rising geographical and cultural distance among the participants makes it
challenging to avoid trading with entities (e.g., companies and individuals) that
are involved with illegal criminal activities such as money laundering, terrorism,
drug cartels, and human trafficking. To tackle such challenges, governments and
international organizations around the world are increasingly interested in issu-
ing smart sanctions lists, which contain the names of entities involved in such
criminal acts [9, 12].
However, these lists vary quite substantially, both in the set of entities be-
ing banned and the timing of their inclusion, even when the target category
that they aim to ban is the same. This difference stems from several sources.
For instance, some institutions might be vigorous in collecting intelligence that
influences others to follow, whereas other lists might be ignored because of a dif-
ferent understanding of the problem. Some authoritative institutions might have
a higher standard of banning an entity, while others might take actions with-
out much undeniable evidence. It is also possible that an institution is merely
copying the entities added to another, prestigious list to project a sense of in-
ternational cooperation, without actively collecting intelligence themselves [5].
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Thus, by analyzing the similarities and differences among such lists, we can shed
some light on the influence network that governs the institutions issuing such
lists. The understanding of such an influence network might result in enriching
our understanding of the global political structure.
In this paper, we describe the application of network analysis to the influence
network that governs the major institutions issuing smart sanctions lists. We use
a dataset that includes over 1,700 smart sanctions lists, mainly focused on ban-
ning global criminal activities and perform a Helmholtz–Hodge decomposition
on the network constructed from this dataset. We show that this simple analysis
readily provides meaningful results, opening the door to a better understanding
of the global political process behind smart sanctions lists.
Many empirical studies measuring the impact of economic sanctions have
restricted their scope to the state-level effects, focusing on the period in which
a comprehensive sanction was enacted at the state level [4]. Meanwhile, studies
focused on economic sanctions targeting specific entities such as firms, individ-
uals, and vessels (i.e., smart sanctions) are relatively new and less understood,
and studies using firm-level data are scarce [1]. Of the few studies to date, [11]
undertook an event study and measured the impact of sanctions-related news
items on the stock market. To the best of our knowledge, no study focused
on analyzing the influence structure among institutions issuing smart sanctions
lists, constructing the influence network from the smart sanctions lists they have
released.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
the dataset used in this paper. We describe how we construct the influence
network from a set of smart sanctions lists. In section 3, we briefly explain the
Helmholtz-Hodge decomposition technique used in this paper. In section 4, we
summarize our result. The final section concludes.
2 Data
Smart sanctions lists are available online for public use. However, named entity
recognition of banned targets, such as companies and individuals, might be a
difficult task due to the variety of ways each institution handle their lists. Thus
we resort to information provided from professional sources. We use the smart
sanctions list data included in the Dow and Jones Adverse Media entity, State-
owned companies, and the Watchlist datasets. The Dow and Jones datasets
contain approximately 1,700 smart sanctions lists from 2001 to the present.
The purpose behind these smart sanctions are illegal activities such as money
laundering, drug uses, fraud, organized crims, and human trafficking, banned air
carriers, and terrorist activity.
There are a total of 85 institutions (e.g., countries and international organiza-
tions) that have issued sanctions lists in our dataset. The top twenty institutions,
in terms of the total number of sanctions lists issued, is provided in Table 1. We
could see the majority is from countries worldwide, but we could also see inter-
national organizations such as the EU and the United Nations. We could also
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rank institution count
1 EU 925
2 United states of america 160
3 Japan 151
4 Canada 53
5 United Nations 39
6 Switzerland 39
7 United Kingdom 35
8 Australia 19
9 Singapore 17
10 Brazil 15
11 South Korea 13
12 India 12
13 Germany 11
14 Hong Kong 11
15 Malaysia 11
16 Russia 9
17 Taiwan 8
18 China 8
19 Turkey 7
20 Philippines 7
21 New Zealand 7
22 Ukraine 7
23 Spain 7
24 Mexico 6
25 Netherlands 5
26 France 5
27 INTERPOL 4
28 Poland 4
29 Isle of Man 4
30 Vietnam 4
Table 1: Ranking of institutions by how many smart sanctions lists they have
issued.
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see that the number of smart sanctions lists issued by each institution varies
quite substantially. The average number of lists issued is 16.7, and the standard
deviation is 92.7 confirming this insight.
(a) Influence network at the level of the smart sanctions
lists
Community Characteristics
A Issued by Japanese
beurocarcy
B Finaical crimes
C Against Iran and
North Korea
D Against Africa
E Embargos
F Against Burma
G Against Lybia
H Terrorism in general
I Against Al-Qaeda
(b) Characteristics of each
communities
Fig. 1: Analysis of community structure of the influence network at the level of
the smart sanctions lists
Each entry in a sanctions list consists of the name of the entity sanctioned
and the date of their inclusion, and we could build two types of influence network
from this dataset. One is the influence network at the smart sanctions lists level
that treats each smart sanctions lists as a node. The network is constructed as
follows. For each pair of smart sanctions lists, if list B included the same entity
on their list after list A, we add a weight (i.e., 1) to the edges between A and B. A
pair of smart sanctions lists have no edges if there are no common target entities
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on the lists. We ignored cases when two lists included an entity on precisely the
same date, of which the direction of influence was not clear.
We show the result in Fig. 1a. Nodes shown in color describes major com-
munities found by standard modularity minimizing algorithms [2, 8]. We see a
lot of isolated nodes (i.e., lists) located at the top of community H and below
community B. These lists are mainly domestic wanted lists issued by countries
that other institutions have less interest in. Besides these lists, the algorithm
identifies nine major communities. Table 1b summarizes the characteristics of
each communities. We observe that smart sanctions lists targeting terrorism, in
general, are located on the left (community H) close to community I that targets
Al-Qaeda. On the bottom of the network, there is a community which targets
Lybia (community G), and right next to it, we have a community that deals
with Africa in general. Smart sanctions lists dealing with domestic Japanese is-
sues have, in many cases, nothing in common with foreign lists which explains
why community A is isolated. However, we could also see several edges between
community A and B, where B deals with financial crimes.
We could also create the influence network at the country level, and this net-
work is used to identify the hierarchical influence structure among institutions
behind smart sanctions. The steps taken are quite similar to the influence net-
work at the smart sanctions lists level. We first treat each institution that has
issued a list as a node. For each pair of institutions, if institution B included the
same entity on their list at a later time than institution A, we add a weight (i.e.,
1) to the edges between A and B. A pair of institutions have no edges if there are
no common entities on the lists that they have issued. We ignored cases when
two institutions added an entity on precisely the same date, and the direction of
influence was not clear. This procedure produces a weighted directed network of
institutions, as shown in Fig. 2. The network can be decomposed into two com-
munities, distinguished with two colors, by standard modularity maximization
techniques [2, 8].
3 Helmholtz–Hodge Decomposition
The flow Fij running from node i to node j in a directed network can be decom-
posed into
Fij = F
p
ij + F
c
ij (1)
where F pij denotes the gradient flow and F
c
ij denotes the circular flow. The cir-
cular flow (i.e., F cij) corresponds to the feedback loops that are inherent in such
networks. The gradient flow (i.e., F pij) can be understood as the hierarchical
component of the network, where information flows from nodes with higher po-
tentials to nodes with lower ones. Mathematically, this can be written as
F pij = wij(φi − φj) (2)
6 Hisano et al.
South Africa
United Kingdom
China
Malaysia
Bulgaria
New Zealand
Monaco
United Nations
Canada
Sweden
Luxembourg
Virgin Islands
Malta
Cyprus
United states of america
OECD
Financial Action Task Force
Poland
Portugal
Ireland
Denmark
Italy
Spain
Hong Kong
INTERPOL
Brazil
Slovenia
Lithuania
Singapore
France
Belgium
Jersey
RussiaGermany
UN Security Council
Kenya
Netherlands
Switzerland
Norway
Japan
Australia
Finland Philippines
Libyan India
Cayman Islands
South Korea
Netherlands Antilles
Guernsey
Word Bank
Bermuda
Bangladesh
Israel
EU
Austria
Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan
Hungary
Bahama
Peru
International Criminal Court
Isle of Man Mexico
Belize
Inter-American Development Bank
ADB
Panama
Slovakia
Sierra Leone
Mauritius
Dubai
Iraq
Argentina
Sri Lanka
ICTR
Egypt
Pakistan
Ukraine
Saudi Arabia
Greece
ICTY
Dominica Republic
Macao
Vietnam
Tunisia
Fig. 2: Influence network at the institution level.
where wij is the weight of the edges between nodes i and j and φi denotes the
Helmholtz–Hodge potential associated with node i. The Helmholtz–Hodge po-
tential of a node reflects its hierarchical position in its flow structure, neglecting
the effect coming from the feedback mechanism. The potential φi for every node
can be easily determined by minimizing the overall squared difference between
the actual flow and the gradient flow (see [6, 7] for more details).
4 Results
In Fig. 3, we show a scatterplot comparing the estimated potentials and the
page rank value of each nodes [3]. We confirm that the Helmholtz–Hodge po-
tential estimated from the Helmholtz–Hodge decomposition gives independent
information that from page rank values.
Table 2 shows the estimated Helmholtz–Hodge potential for all the 85 insti-
tutions analzyed in this paper. The G7 countries (i.e., Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are shown in bold font.
We can see that the OECD and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), which are primarily focused on specific issues, top the list, showing that
they are less influenced by the sanctions lists issued by other institutions.
Among the G7 countries, Japan scores the lowest. This is to be expected, be-
cause Japan is relatively inactive when it comes to gathering information outside
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Fig. 3: Scatterplot comparing page rank value and Helmholtz-Hodge potential of
each node.
of Japan, and merely follows lists created by international organizations [5]. The
fact that the UN Security Council and EU are quite low on the list is also no-
table, as these two organizations require a higher standard of banning compared
to lists issued at a country level. To summarize, our analysis provides meaningful
insights into the hierarchical influences underlying smart sanctions lists.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we performed two things. One is we showed how to construct
an influence network governing smart sanctions at the country level, from the
smart sanctions lists they have issued. We then showed that by performing a
Helmholtz–Hodge decomposition of the influence network, we could shed some
light on the influence network that governs the institutions issuing such lists.
This opens the door to better understanding the hidden global political structure
behind smart sanctions.
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rank institution potential
1 OECD 1.176
2 ICTR 1.148
3 Argentina 1.06
4 Saudi Arabia 0.985
5 Egypt 0.909
6 Bangladesh 0.857
7 Sweden 0.843
8 Vietnam 0.792
9 ICTY 0.787
10 Guernsey 0.769
11 Tunisia 0.762
12 Panama 0.664
13 Portugal 0.607
14 Mexico 0.593
15 Norway 0.587
16 Denmark 0.570
17 France 0.482
18 China 0.473
19 Slovenia 0.470
20 Germany 0.441
21 Ireland 0.386
22 Bahama 0.350
23 Singapore 0.349
24 United Nations 0.299
25 Sierra Leone 0.298
26 United Kingdom 0.284
27 Netherlands 0.272
28 Slovakia 0.264
29 Jersey 0.243
30 Luxembourg 0.222
31 Switzerland 0.214
32 Austria 0.185
33 Spain 0.173
34 Hong Kong 0.169
35 Mauritius 0.161
36 United states of america 0.148
37 Word Bank 0.133
38 South Africa 0.126
39 New Zealand 0.107
40 Italy 0.101
41 Cyprus 0.084
42 Isle of Man 0.079
43 Belgium 0.060
(a) Rank 1 to rank 43.
rank institution potential
44 Inter-American Development Bank 0.053
45 Bulgaria 0.050
46 Canada 0.029
47 Cayman Islands 0.022
48 Poland -0.019
49 Virgin Islands -0.030
50 Dubai -0.052
51 INTERPOL -0.057
52 Lithuania -0.063
53 Japan -0.145
54 Financial Action Task Force -0.150
55 Monaco -0.182
56 Malta -0.189
57 India -0.242
58 Belize -0.274
59 Philippines -0.277
60 Australia -0.278
61 Dominica Republic -0.295
62 Iraq -0.320
63 International Criminal Court -0.332
64 EU -0.334
65 Netherlands Antilles -0.343
66 Israel -0.359
67 Bermuda -0.385
68 South Korea -0.421
69 Hungary -0.435
70 ADB -0.448
71 Malaysia -0.489
72 Russia -0.523
73 Libyan -0.679
74 Macao -0.831
75 Sri Lanka -0.872
76 Ukraine -0.900
77 Kenya -0.951
78 UN Security Council -0.981
79 Kazakhstan -1.006
80 Kyrgyzstan -1.047
81 Pakistan -1.057
82 Brazil -1.057
83 Peru -1.087
84 Finland -1.286
85 Greece -1.435
(b) Rank 44 to rank 85.
Table 2: Estimated Helmholtz–Hodge potentials. G7 countries are denoted in
bold font.
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